After reading various sources on the pace of Iraqi and Afghan reconstruction programs, it becomes readily apparent that serious problems emerge when trying to structure how aid is spent. Frankly, I'm beginning to wonder if it's even worthwhile to spend money on reconstruction programs until Afghanistan and Iraq are in post-conflict enviroments.
Let's take a look at the number of factors which hinder successful reconstruction:
- Astronomical security costs - numerous sources have shown how the high costs of providing security to employees and corporations working in Iraq and Afghanistan are exhorbant, if not outright prohibitive. I recall one aid organization spending almost $3 million on security for one outpost in Helmand province alone. Numerous contractors have pulled out of Iraq because security costs in some cases were driving up expenditures by 50% at least.
- Gross mismanagment/poor planning - A general problem which seems to plague a lot international aid programs, even in non-conflict environments. With so much money being spent on aid programs, lots of people in Washington, regardless of political affiliations, put a heavy amount of pressure on the people in the field to show results. Consequently, the people in the field have to spend a lot of their time making their bosses in DC or elsewhere happy. A common critique of aid programs in general has been that they are initially conceived on too grand of a scale. Support for aid often is present only when the goal is something big, like "fostering civil rights in Afghanistan", and support isn't as strong when the program is "giving farmers in such a such province a few tractors" becuase micro-programs like that aren't nearly as interesting politically.
- Direct conflict with insurgents - both Iraqi insurgents and the Taliban have made a point of targeting aid workers and any locals who work with them. Almost as soon as some projects have been completed, the insurgencies have moved against them. Aid workers also become a target for insurgent propaganda, and consequently locals tend to treat them with a great deal of suspicion and mistrust.
Don't get me wrong here, I'm all for helping to rebuild Iraq and Afghanistan. The problem is that there are numerous ways in which an aid program can be undermined in a non-conflict zone, and there are even more ways in which a program can go wrong in a war zone. Any one of the above factors has the ability to cripple the effectiveness of international aid, and they've all been present in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Basic question - is reconstruction even possible in a war zone? If it's not, what do we do about the reconstruction aid we're spending? Wouldn't it be a giant waste of money and resources if you can't accomplish anything? If it is possible to reconstruct a society in a war zone, how do you do it? Our programs in Iraq and Afghanistan have been a mixed bag at best. How do you create an effective reconstruction program in an active war zone?